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Abstract
This article examines the relationship between the existence of control rights and 
property in separated human biomaterials. Much of the theory as to what constitutes 
property is examined and it is contended that Article 22 of the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine does not presuppose property in such materials. An analysis is 
undertaken of the case-law relating to control and property in sperm and embryos from 
the UK, Australia and the US and the shortcomings of utilising the property paradigm in 
these disputes are highlighted.
Keywords
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 Introduction
Issues relating to the existence of property and control rights in separated 
human biomaterials are invariably linked. The development of technology 
that allows such materials to be utilised in research and artificial reproduction 
ex vivo has led to a myriad of questions concerning the status of such materials 
once they have been separated from the living body.1 Often, these disputes are 
1 I. Goold, K. Greasley, J. Herring and L. Skene (eds.), Persons, Parts and Property: How Should 
We Regulate Human Tissue in the 21st Century (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014); J. Herring and 
P.L. Chaau, ‘My Body, Your Body, Our Bodies’, 15 Medical Law Review (2007) 34-61, at 38-40; 
W. Boulier, ‘Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize Property Rights 
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framed so as to resolve the question as to who is entitled to ‘property’ in the 
biomaterial once it has been separated from the person.2 Of course, invoking 
‘property’ and the property paradigm — of itself — gives little guidance as 
to precisely which rights are in dispute.3 In actuality, two broad categories of 
rights are at issue in these cases: the right to derive income from the biomate-
rial and the right to control the biomaterial.4 Disputes over income rights have 
focused on the right to join in the profits of research conducted with the mate-
rial. The famous case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California5 is a 
typical example. That case was framed as a property dispute. The question was 
whether the source of excised cells, Moore, or the researchers who had devel-
oped a valuable cell line with them had ‘property’ in the material. Of course, 
had Mr. Moore succeeded in this argument, he would have sought to join in the 
lucrative profits that the research would generate.
There are other ‘property’ issues, however, that are not concerned with 
income rights, i.e., those concerned with controlling the fate of the biomate-
rial itself. In such cases, we are again concerned with the rights that the source 
of the material retains in it once it has been separated from the living body. 
Such issues commonly arise in relation to research, or the storage, destruction 
and use of gametes or embryos. Much of the case-law concerns biomaterials 
that have been held to be property ‘as a means of permitting remedial action 
and compensation for damage done, and most recently, in order to permit 
possession of sperm for the purposes of in vitro fertilisation’.6 Property law is 
in Human Body Parts’, 23 Hofstra L. Rev. (1994) 693; L.B. Andrews, ‘My Body, My Property’, 
16(5) Hastings Center Report (1986) 28-38, R. Rao, ‘Property, Privacy, and the Human Body’, 
80 Buffalo University Law Rev (2000) 359.
2 As there is ‘no property’ in the human body, some type of separation is necessary before we 
can talk of ‘property’ in the biomaterial: J.E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford: OUP, 
1997), pp. 105-127; J.W. Harris, ‘Who Owns My Body?’, 16(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
(1996) 55-84; S.R. Munzer, A Theory of Property (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), pp. 37-58; M. Quigley, ‘Property in Human Biomaterials — Separating Persons and 
Things?’, 32(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2012) 659-683.
3 D.C. Hubin, ‘Human Reproductive Interests: Puzzles at the Periphery of the Property 
Paradigm’, 29 Social Philosophy and Policy (2012) 106-125, at 107.
4 M. Quigley, ‘Propertisation and Commercialisation: On Controlling the Uses of Human 
Biomaterials’, 77 Modern Law Review (2014) 677-702.
5 793 P 2d 479 (Cal. 1990). Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital 244 F.Supp.2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 
2003) and Washington University v. Catalona 437 F.Supp.2d 985 (F.D. Missouri, 2006) are 
two more recent examples of disputes over income rights in human materials. See also: 
R. Rao, ‘Genes and Spleens: Property, Contract or Privacy Rights in the Human Body?’, 
35 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics (2007) 371-382.
6 L. Skene, ‘Raising Issues With a Property Approach’, in: Goold et al., supra note 1. 
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attractive to judges, as it enables a remedy to be provided where otherwise 
there would be none. It is also a means of providing continuing rights to sub-
sequent owners, as it can confer rights in rem over a thing as well as rights 
in personam against a person.7 Thus, property is useful as it can fill in lacunae 
in the law.8 The temptation then, as Goold and Quigley note, is to engage in 
‘backwards reasoning’ aimed at finding property in order to achieve the ‘right 
result’ with little principled justificatory work.9
The relationship between property and control lends some support to 
this view. The existence of control rights has been used to justify a finding 
of property in these materials.10 Conversely, however, property is sometimes 
used to justify control, i.e. property protects the control of human biomateri-
als in whom we believe that control ought to vest.11 While it may be tempting 
to think that control rights and property are synonymous, this is not neces-
sarily the case. Control rights do not inevitably lead to property.12 This article 
examines this inconsistent relationship between control rights and property, 
and finds that it is bedevilled by conceptual uncertainty. Part 1 sets out the 
various theories which seek to identify what property is; part 2 examines 
Article 22 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, and posits 
that it does not presuppose property; Part 3 examines the case-law relating to 
control and property in sperm and embryos from the UK, Australia and the US; 
Part 4 concludes.
1 Identifying What We Mean by Property
Property is complex, and may refer to a myriad of entitlements in a particu-
lar resource. To conceive of property as a bundle of rights is a useful analyti-
cal took, and is often the first legal conception of property encountered by 
law students. This theory describes property as a series of normative relations 
between people regarding things, in contrast to relationships between persons 
7 Ibid., 266.
8 L.B. Moses, ‘The Problem With Alternatives: The Importance of Property Law in 
Regulating Excised Human Tissue and In Vitro Human Embryos’, in Goold et al., supra 
note 1, 205.
9 I. Goold and M. Quigley, ‘Human Biomaterials: The Case for a Property Approach’, in 
Goold et al., ibid., 231-241.
10 Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] 3 W.L.R. 118.
11 Goold and Quigley, supra note 9, 236; York v. Jones 717 F.Supp, 421, 422 (E.D. Va. 1989); 
B. Steinbock, ‘Sperm as Property’, 6 Stanford Law and Policy Review (1994-1995) 57-71, 60.
12 Hubin, supra note 3, 113.
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and the things themselves.13 The ‘bundle of rights’ theory combines two influ-
ential analyses of property. First, Hohfeld’s description of in rem rights as a 
myriad of liberties, claim-rights, powers and immunities that an owner holds 
against others.14 Then, in his influential essay ‘Ownership’, Honoré set down 
the ‘standard incidents’ of ownership, that are often found in this bundle.15 The 
bundle which emerges is indeed complex, containing a wide variety of legal 
relationships, not simply rights.
A number of the standard incidents are as follows:
1) The right to possess (right to exclusive physical control, coupled with a 
claimright to non-interference),
2) The right to use (a claim right to exclusive use which implies a duty on 
the part of others not to use the thing without permission),
3) The right to the capital, including the power to transfer, alienate and 
destroy the thing,
4) The right to manage, which is the power to contract with others concern-
ing the various uses of a thing,
5) The right to security,
6) The right to the income.16
These rights are can be further categorised into control rights (numbers 1-5 
above), and income rights (number 6).17 Control, according to Christman, 
‘refers to the ability on the part of the person to be the final arbiter over what 
is done with a thing unless this is contracted away’.18 These are independent 
powers of the owner, as they are not dependent on the consent of others. 
Honoré noted that, on a broad-interpretation, use and management powers 
13 J.E. Penner, ‘The Bundle of Rights Picture of Property’, 43 UCLA Law Rev. (1993) 711.
14 W.N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning: And Other 
Legal Essays (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1920).
15 A.M. Honoré, ‘Ownership’, in: A.G. Guest, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: a Collaborative 
Work (London: OUP, 1961), pp. 107-147.
16 There are other, less central incidents, enumerated by Honoré; namely transmissibility, 
absence of term, prohibition of harmful use and the residuary character of ownership. Of 
course not all of these are ‘rights’, ibid., 113.
17 Harris refers to these rights as ‘use and control’ rights and I will adopt this method 
of referring to them throughout the article: J.W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 1996).
18 J. Christman, ‘Self-ownership, Equality, and the Structure of Property Rights’, 19 Political 
Theory (1991) 28-46, 29. 
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overlap.19 On a narrower interpretation, ‘use’ merely refers to one’s right to per-
sonal enjoyment of the thing owned, and excludes management and income. 
The right to use at one’s discretion, he noted, is one of the cardinal features of 
ownership, and the fact that certain limitations are present within the stan-
dard incidents (such as the prohibition of harmful use) does not detract from 
this as they are precisely defined, while the permissible types of use ‘constitute 
an open list’.20 Management powers do not concern personal use, but the right 
to decide how the thing owned shall be used by others. They include powers to 
license and permit others to make use of the thing, to define the limits of this 
permission and to contract with regard to such use.21
The bundle metaphor does not provide us with the ‘core’ of property, 
i.e. a tool to distinguish property from lesser interests,22 but may provide a 
de minimus threshold below which an interest is definitely not property.23 
In this regard, Honoré notes that:
. . . the listed incidents are not individually necessary, though they may be 
together sufficient, conditions for the person of inherence to be designated 
‘owner’ of a particular thing in a given system . . . [Furthermore] . . . the 
use of ‘owner’ will extend to cases in which not all the listed incidents 
are present.24
Or, as Quigley notes: ‘while every stick in the bundle is sometimes referred 
to as a property right, individual rights are not constitutive of ownership’.25 
Thus, while there are incidents associated with ownership that are generally 
accepted as standard (for tangible property at least), it is difficult to identify 
any one essential feature common to all types of property. In addition, and 
this is important, it does not follow from the recognition of an ownership 
19 Honoré (1961), supra note 15, 116.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 In the civil law tradition, however, ownership is not defined by reference to its contents: 
for the position in Scotland see K.G.C. Reid, ’Body Parts and Property’, University of 
Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper Series, No 2015/25, p 7. 
23 M. Quigley, ‘On Controlling the Uses of Human Biomaterials’ supra note 4, 690; A.M. 
Honoré, ‘Property and Ownership: Marginal Comments’, in: T. Endicott, J. Getzler and 
E. Peel (eds.), The Properties of Law: Essays in Honour of Jim Harris (Oxford: OUP, 2006), 
p. 137.
24 Honoré (1961), supra note 15, 112-113.
25 Ibid.
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entitlement, that any other entitlement is then recognised and protected.26 
Honoré seems to suggest that some incidents are more important to establish-
ing ownership than others, but that is the extent of the guidance provided.27 
Furthermore, ownership rhetoric tends towards convincing us that having 
property in different things equates with having roughly the same set of rights 
in those things.28 That, of course, is not the case.
Professor Harris provides a detailed description of property that more 
clearly demarcates property rights from non-property rights.29 A property 
institution, he states, contains two elements: trespassory rules and the owner-
ship spectrum.30 Trespassory rules forbid a certain class of people from making 
any use of the thing without consent of the ‘owner’, but they do not elaborate 
the uses which the owner may make of the thing.31 The ‘ownership spectrum’ 
is concerned with the set of ‘open-ended’ relationships that are protected by 
trespassory rules.32 The relationships are open-ended in the sense that it is 
impossible to concretely list all of them. This is a reflection of the fact that it 
would be impossible to reduce an ownership interest to the rules that protect 
it.33 These rights must also authorise self-seekingness by their owner, in order 
to distinguish them from public property.34
A variety of ownership interests may be recognised, and transmissibility is 
only an essential feature of an ownership interest in money. There a higher end 
and a lower end to the spectrum. At the higher end is ‘full blooded ownership’ 
which entails unlimited powers of control and transmission of the resource 
(unless the exercise of the power infringes some property independent prohi-
bition). At the lower end of the spectrum ‘mere property’ embraces some open 
ended set of use privileges over a resource and some open ended sets of power 
26 As noted by J. Wall, ‘The Legal Status of Body Parts: a Framework’, 31 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies (2011) 783-793.
27 Honoré, supra note 15, 113.
28 Hubin, supra note 3, 107-109.
29 Harris, supra note 2.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid. In Wall’s view, control rights can be protected by two types of trespassory rules: 
property rules and liability rules in the taxonomy of Calebresi and Melamed: G. Calabresi 
and A.D. Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral’, Harvard Law Review (1972) 1089-1128. 
32 Harris, supra note 2.
33 Although property has been characterised as the right to exclude: T. Merrill, ‘Property and 
the Right to Exclude’, 77 Nebraska Law Review (1998) 730. 
34 J.W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 5-6, 100-118.
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of control over uses made by others. Harris posits that any purported property 
rights in the body would be ‘mere property’ at best.35
2 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine: Does it Presuppose 
Property?
Article 22 of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine states:
When in the course of an intervention any part of a human body is 
removed, it may be stored and used for a purpose other than that for 
which it was removed, only if this is done in conformity with appropriate 
information and consent procedures.36
Beyleveld and Brownsword argue, inter alia, that the regime of informed 
consent contained in this article ‘presupposes the very property thesis that 
it tries to avoid’.37 They draw a distinction between the taking of body parts 
and tissue, and the use to which they are put. The law relating to the former 
(takings) is protected by recognising a right to bodily integrity and removing 
any tissue without appropriate consent would clearly infringe such a right.38 
Rights relating to use and control of body parts after they have been separated 
from the body are not concerned with bodily integrity, as the part has already 
been removed from the body. These use and control rights, it is contended by 
the authors, seem more like property.39
That the source of the excised material retains an interest in it is implicit 
in the post-removal consent requirements of Article 22. The crucial aspect of 
Article 22 is that only the source of the material retains some manner of open-
ended relationship to it, not the researcher in possession of it. The uses to 
which the latter may put the material is not open-ended, as it is fully described 
by the terms of the consent. In contrast, it is not possible to exhaustively 
35 Ibid., 351-361.
36 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the 
Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine (DIR/JUR (96(14))) (Strasbourg; Directorate of Legal 
Affairs, 1996).
37 D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, ‘My Body, My Body Parts, My Property?’, 8(2) Health Care 
Analysis (2000) 87-99, 88.
38 A. Grubb, ‘I, Me, Mine: Bodies, Parts and Property’, 3 Medical Law International (1998) 299.
39 Ibid., 300; Beyleveld and Brownsword, supra note 37, 90.
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enumerate the range of uses to which the source of the material may consent 
to, and the power is thus open-ended and akin to rights on Harris’s ownership 
spectrum. This is reflected in the fact that a fresh consent would be required 
if it was proposed to put the material to a use other than that originally 
consented to. Beyleveld and Brownsword do not expressly mention ‘open-
endedness’, but do note that the rights contemplated under Article 22 ‘give us 
control over the post-removal use of our body parts, by granting us not only 
the right to set the initial bounds of permitted use but also to sanction any 
deviation from such permitted use’.40 Furthermore, they distinguish a scenario 
(based on avoiding religious harm) where certain uses are expressly prohibited, 
from that pertaining under Article 22. In this scenario, the consent is drafted 
as a list of prohibited uses. So, the material can be put to any use so long as it 
is not one of the prohibited uses. As long as this requirement is fulfilled, there 
is no need for a new consent to every change of use of the material.41 Under 
Article 22, however, every change of use must be subject to a fresh consent, 
implying that the subject has a protected interest in the excised tissue most 
easily explained as a property relationship.42
Nevertheless, it is not correct to assert that these rights are use and con-
trol rights. Use rights in Honoré’s standard incidents are claim-rights to exclu-
sive use which imply a duty on the part of others not to use the thing without 
permission.43 Article 22 does not protect ‘exclusive use’ by the source of the 
material. Rather, it sets out the right to manage, i.e. the power to contract with 
others concerning the various uses of a thing.44 On a broad interpretation of 
use, use and management powers are one category: one’s right to manage a 
thing comes from your right to use it.45 As Harris notes: ‘The idea of prop-
erty comprises the notion that something that pertains to a person is, maybe 
within drastic limits, his to use as he pleases and therefore his to permit 
others to use gratuitously or for exchanged favours’.46 This will not always be 
the case, however, and there are situations where the right to manage a thing 
arises independently of the right to exclusive use of it. It is conceivable, in a 
situation such as happened in the Moore case, that the source of a sample may 
have no entitlement to possession or exclusive use of excised biomaterial. Yet, 
40 Beyleveld and Brownsword, supra note 37, 90.
41 Ibid., 92.
42 Ibid., 93.
43 Honoré, supra note 15, 113.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., 116.
46 Harris, supra n 34, 28.
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this would not prevent the introduction of a legal requirement that any use 
of the material be consented to by the source.
In this situation, the rights to manage would clearly be independent of the 
right to use. As noted, Article 22 allows the source of the biomaterial to initially 
set the boundaries of permitted use, and to subsequently sanction any devia-
tion from this. This does not imply that these management powers arise from 
a right to use vesting in the source immediately after the intervention. Indeed, 
the existence of such rights has proved highly controversial.47
If one is to accept this contention that the management powers contem-
plated by Article 22 are quite separate from any rights of exclusive use that 
might or might not vest in the source of the material, this undermines the 
claim that Article 22 presupposes property. As Honoré, and subsequent com-
mentators have stated, though individual incidents may be referred to as prop-
erty rights, they are not constitutive of ownership.48 An individual right, such 
as the right to manage, is neither necessary nor sufficient for ownership in the 
absence of other incidents.49 To benefit from rights on the ownership spec-
trum protected in these circumstances does not lead to a conclusion that we 
are talking about property rights.
3 Control, Sperm and Embryos
3.1 Control and Property Under the UK Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990
The relationship between control and property in human biomaterials has 
featured in a number of cases involving sperm and embryos that are artificially 
preserved and stored outside the body. Prior to the advent of technology that 
would enable such artificial preservation, the question as to who owned such 
material ex vivo was of little relevance. It is thus a novel and often trouble-
some question for judges to unravel. Some commentators believe the existence 
of control rights should always equate with property, albeit not full-blooded 
ownership.50 At times, this approach is followed and the existence of control 
rights is used to justify the existence of property, though there is little consis-
tency, and at other times, the existence of a property right founded on some 
47 Rao, supra note 5.
48 Honoré, supra note 23; Quigley, supra note 4, 690.
49 Cf. S. Douglas, ‘Property Rights in Human Biomaterials’, in: Goold et al., supra note 1, 
pp. 90, 92, 104-108; Merrill, supra note 41, 730. 
50 J.A. Robertson, ‘Posthumous Reproduction’, 69 Indiana Law Journal (1994) 1035, 1038-1039.
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other reasoning, is used to justify control over the samples in question.51 In the 
former case, such rights to control may be found in specialised statutes, and it 
is to these the courts have looked in determining the question of property.52
In the United Kingdom, such a specialised statute exists in the form of 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (the HFEA 1990) which 
regulates the storage and use of gametes and embryos outside of the human 
body. The act created a detailed statutory framework for the storage of human 
gametes. Its effect is to greatly restrict the use which may be made of such sam-
ples by both the licensed authority and the donors of the samples themselves. 
Yet, the limited control rights retained by the donor under the act have been 
deemed sufficient justification to classify the samples as the donor’s property. 
This was the finding in Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust.53 The claimants in 
Yearworth deposited frozen sperm at one of the Defendant’s hospitals, licensed 
under the HFEA 1990. The samples were destroyed and it fell to the court to 
determine if the sperm constituted ‘property’ in order to resolve a damages 
claim for their destruction.
Lord Clarke CJ noted that the men alone generated the sperm by their 
bodies,54 an ambiguous statement that has been considered capable of being 
construed as ‘neo-Lockian in tone [or], alluding to a natural rights view of 
property’.55 ‘Ownership’, in the judge’s view, was ‘no more than a convenient 
global description of different collections of rights held by persons over physi-
cal things’.56 He cited Honoré and noted that not all of these rights need be 
present for ownership to arise, and that the limitations on use prescribed by 
the standard incidents of ownership did not detract from its importance as a 
‘cardinal feature’ of ownership’57 The court found that the act preserved the 
claimant’s ‘absolute negative control’ over the use and continued storage of 
51 Steinbock, supra note 11, 60.
52 In line with the approach advocated in Moore, supra note 5.
53 [2009] 3 W.L.R. 118; C. Hawes, ‘Property Interests in Body Parts: Yearworth v. North Bristol 
NHS Trust 73 Modern Law Review (2010) 119; L. Skene, ‘Commentary: Proprietary Interests 
in Human Body Material: Yearworth, Recent Australian Cases on Stored Semen and Their 
Implications’, 20 Medical Law Review (2012) 227; S. Harmon and G. Laurie, ‘Yearworth v. 
North Bristol NHS Trust: Property, Principles, Precedents and Paradigms’, 69 Cambridge 
Law Journal (2010) 476-493; L.D. Rostill, ‘The Ownership that wasn’t Meant to Be: 
Yearworth and Property Rights in Human Tissue’, 40 Journal of Medical Ethics (2014) 14-18. 
54 [2009] 3 W.L.R. 118, para. 45(f).
55 M. Quigley, ‘Property: The Future of Human Tissue’, 17 Medical Law Review (2009) 457-466, 
461.
56 Supra note 54, para. 28.
57 Ibid.
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the sperm.58 The samples could not be used for the purpose of any treatment 
without donor’s consent. Also, they could require a sample’s destruction at any 
time through the withdrawal of the consent to storage.
Although Yearworth provides a precedent for recognising property rights in 
the source of human materials, there are limitations. First, the recognition of 
property rights is confined to use and control rights, and does not extend to 
income rights. The position in Moore, where the source may be excluded from 
the income derived from their biomaterials, is distinguishable.59 Secondly, 
having ownership rights over a particular thing does not necessitate a find-
ing of property, and the conceptual foundation of the Court’s finding was not 
made entirely clear.60 Harmon and Laurie criticise the shallowness of the dis-
cussion of the question of property in the case, and the failure of the court to 
adequately justify such a conclusion by grounding its finding in much of the 
legal and bioethical scholarship that has been written on the question.61
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the relationship between the men and 
the samples has many features characteristic of a property institution. Clearly, 
the statutory restrictions meant they did not enjoy full blooded ownership. In 
contrast to the position under Article 22 of the Convention on Biomedicine, 
more than one of Honoré’s standard incidents is present. The men retained 
use rights, management rights, and in being able to order the destruction of 
the sample, retained one feature of the right to capital. In addition to the exis-
tence of such rights on the ownership spectrum, there was an element of self-
seekingness in that they could consent to the use of the sperm for any reason, 
or none.
The question as to whether the men had an open-ended set of relationships 
to the samples in terms of use is more complex. The uses that the samples 
could be applied for are expressly enumerated by the Act, i.e., the provision 
of treatment services to the donor and his partner, or to others, or in pursu-
ance of research. It can hardly be said then that the types of use that might 
have been made by the men of the samples are too exhaustive to enumerate. 
Nonetheless, the category of persons who may have benefited from the treat-
ment services in the use of the sperm was open-ended, and it this tends to 
support the conclusion that the men retained property in their samples. While 
the purposes for which the semen could be used were limited, the manner in 
which they could be applied for this purpose was not.
58 Ibid., para 45(f)(ii).
59 Quigley, supra note 4.
60 Harmon and Laurie, supra note 53, 484.
61 Ibid., 486.
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One of the notable features of this case is that the Court of Appeal did 
not base its finding of property on the work/skill exception set down in 
Doodeward v. Spence,62 described as a case ‘lacking in solid foundation’ and 
‘not entirely logical’ in that it could lead to a finding of property in certain 
excised materials, but not in others, for no good reason.63 In basing their find-
ings on the objective fact of control that the men had in the samples, the 
court attempted to put an end to such inconsistency — a worthwhile goal. 
Nonetheless, the great difficulty with Yearworth is not the internal logic of the 
decision, but the fact that an almost identical case was decided without refer-
ence to the stored biomaterials being property. Evans v. Amicus Healthcare64 
was a dispute concerning the fate of embryos under the HFEA 1990. The rights 
retained in the fertilised embryo by the gamete donors were almost identical 
to that of gamete donors with the complicating factor that there were two par-
ties who had to consent to the storage and use of the sperm, and either party 
could withdraw this consent up to the time of implantation.65
Both parties clearly had management and use entitlements in the sperm. 
When one of the parties wished to withdraw his consent, the court was obli-
gated to prefer one of the entitlement holders over the other, favouring the 
entitlement holder who had elected that the embryo not be used. As Wall notes, 
however, ‘in contrast to Yearworth where management and use entitlements 
in reproductive material were also litigated, the management and use inter-
ests in Evans were recognised and prioritised without treating the fertilised 
embryo as property’.66 Of course, the detailed statutory scheme contained in 
the HFEA 1990 provided a method for resolving the dispute between two enti-
tlement holders with conflicting wishes, i.e. Ms Evans’ wish to use the embryos 
for reproduction and her partner’s wish that they not be so used. Recourse to 
the rubric ‘property’ was thus unnecessary in order to resolve the dispute.67 
The judgment does not rule out the possibility that the embryos were in fact 
property. Rather, the court was not called upon to decide the issue.
In the recent Scots case of Holdich v. Lothian Health Board,68 the pursuer 
sought damages for the destruction of irreplaceable sperm. Yearworth was 
closely examined. Indeed, the defendants argued that the pursuer was trying 
62 [1908] H.C.A. 45.
63 Supra note 54, para. 45(d).
64 [2003] E.W.C.A. Civ. 727.
65 Ibid., para. 165.
66 Wall, supra note 26, 7. 
67 HFEA Act 2009, schedule 3.
68 [2013] S.C.S.O.H. 197.
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to ‘put a kilt on Yearworth’.69 Of course, Scots law is significantly different to 
English law, but the defendants also sought to distinguish Yearworth on its own 
terms. Lord Stewart’s lucid and illuminating decision gives a tepid assessment 
of the manner in which the Court of Appeal dealt with the property issue in 
Yearworth. He stated that the Yearworth court derived property from the ‘right 
to use’, only one of the eleven incidents of ownership identified by Honoré, and 
as a result, one need not ‘demonstrate ownership in a global sense to be eligi-
ble for a Yearworth  — type remedy’.70 He questioned whether it is appropriate 
to classify stored sperm as property ‘even in a minimalist, Yearworth sense’.71 In 
this regard, the court held that the availability of possessory remedies, such as 
exist for the burial of corpses, does not necessarily make the objects such rem-
edies property.72 Accepting that gametes are sui generis and neither persons 
or property, the judge noted, is advantageous as it allows personal or property 
type remedies to be utilised in different contexts, without distorting any doc-
trinal framework.73
The focus of Lord Stewart’s opinion on the property question in Holdich is 
of great interest, as he specifically contemplates that there may an intermedi-
ate class of ‘things’ that are subject to some of the incidents of ownership, but 
which are not appropriately described as property. Such an approach has merit 
as the tendency of the non-specialist to conflate full-blooded ownership with 
lesser forms of ownership, as one of the parties had done in Holdich,74 only 
increases doctrinal confusion. Lord Stewart’s approach takes the focus away 
from whether property exists as a category, and instead examines which rem-
edies are most appropriate in a given factual matrix. The former question was 
of relevance by necessity in Yearworth so that a remedy would be available to 
the parties that would not otherwise be. It would inappropriate then to apply 
this approach to other cases where a finding of property is unimportant to 
determining the real issues between the parties.
69 Ibid., para. 15; Reid, supra note 22.
70 Holdich, supra note 68, para. 46. Although, as I have noted above, it is arguable that 
management rights and one feature of the right to capital are also present.
71 Ibid., para. 47.
72 Ibid., para. 49.
73 Ibid., para. 52.
74 Ibid., para. 46.
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4.2 Embryos as Property?
Both gametes and embryos differ from other human tissue in their potential 
for the creation of human life. They have readily usable genetic information.75 
Embryos differ from gametes in that they have two progenitors (both of whom 
will ultimately become genetic parents). An embryo has also been fertilised 
and there is still ethical and legal debate as to whether it should be character-
ised as a person, property or in some interim category between these two.76 
The case-law reveals property-like language being used, even if property itself 
is not always explicitly invoked.77 The reluctance to recognise embryos as prop-
erty may reflect a fear of treating the body and any material that will develop 
into a human being ‘as the personal property equivalent of cans or television 
sets’.78 Property, it has been observed, is useful as a legal category when we 
talk of in personam rights allowing courts to resolve disputes by utilising tort 
and contract law.79 It is less useful when the potential harms relating to com-
modification or full blooded ownership in these materials is raised.80 Disputes 
generally focus on who has dispositional authority over embryos, i.e. over who 
has control. The most common dispute is between the progenitors who have 
conflicting wishes as to the use (if any) that the embryos are to be put to.81 
There may also be a dispute between the progenitors and the clinic where the 
embryos are being stored.82
In disputes between progenitors, the question as whether embryos are 
property is of little assistance in deciding who has dispositional authority. 
As noted, property was not even raised in Evans as an issue. There are also 
75 R.S. Jansen, ‘Sperm and Ova as Property’, 11 Journal of Medical Ethics (1985) 123.
76 L.S. Langley and J.W. Blackston, ‘Sperm, Egg and a Petri Dish: Unveiling the Underlying 
Property Issues Surrounding Cryopreserved Embryos’, Journal of Legal Medicine (2006) 
167-206, 167; J. Berg, ‘Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and 
Foetuses’, 40 Wake Forest Law Review (2005) 159. 
77 Davis v. Davis 842 S.W.2d 588 (Ten. 1992).
78 B. Brown, ‘Reconciling Property Law with Advances in Reproductive Science’, 6 Stanford 
Law and Policy Review (1994-1995) 73, 75.
79 L.B. Moses, ‘The problem with Alternatives: The Importance of Property Law in Regulating 
Excised Human Tissue and In Vitro Human Embryos’, in Goold et al., supra note 1, 197.
80 Ibid.
81 As was the case in Evans v. Amicus Healthcare [2003] E.W.H.C. 2161. See also: Davis v. 
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589-92; Kass v. Kass 696 N.E.2d (N.Y. 1998); AZ v. BZ 725 N.E.2d 1051, 
1051-54 (Mass. 2000); JB v. MB, 783 A.2d 707, 709-10 (N.J. 2001); In re Marriage of Witten, 
672 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Iowa, 2003). 
82 York v. Jones 717 F.Supp, 421, 422 (E.D. Va.1989).
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a number of American cases on this point. Davis v. Davis,83 for instance, 
described embryos as an ‘interim category’ between property and persons, but 
the case was ultimately decided on a balancing of the parties’ interests. In Kass 
v. Kass,84 the embryos were described in the agreement to storage as ‘property’, 
but this was irrelevant to the decision as it was held that the prior agreement 
was enforceable and thus determinative of the dispute. Similar outcomes were 
reached in JB v. MB,85 and In re Marriage of Witten.86
In York v. Jones87 there was a dispute between the progenitors of the embryos 
and the IVF clinic. The former had moved house and wished their embryos 
transferred to another clinic. This was not a use provided for in the prior agree-
ment to storage, and the clinic argued that the list of uses in the agreement 
was exhaustive of the claimants’ rights in the embryos. The court disagreed. It 
held that the agreement created an inference that the clinic fully recognised 
the couple’s property rights in the embryos and were thus a bailee of those 
embryos. The contract thus limited the clinic’s dominion and control over the 
embryos, but not the claimants’.88 The finding of property here was used to 
justify granting the claimants control over the embryos in circumstances not 
contemplated by the original contract. Thus, property was used to trump the 
claims of the clinic which was not a progenitor.
The resort to the question of property in this case resolved the question as 
to who had control of the embryos in the absence of a law governing this ques-
tion, such as a contractual term or statutory provision. As between progeni-
tors, however, property is of little use in determining who should have control 
over these materials, and the courts have had to resort to other legal means 
(enforcement of prior contract, or balancing of parties interests) to resolve 
these disputes. It is of note that, in none of the cases discussed in this section, 
was an embryo ordered to be used for reproduction against the wishes of one 
of the progenitors, even though the legal basis for these decisions differed.89 
This tends to lend support to the view that property is employed in a prag-
matic rather than a principled way by the courts, to justify a result favoured by 
the judge instead of flowing naturally from property existing in the material in 
the first place.
83 Supra note 77.
84 696 N.E.2d (N.Y. 1998).
85 Supra note 81.
86 Ibid.
87 Supra note 82.
88 Ibid., 422-427.
89 Langley and Blackston, supra note 77.
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4.3 The Relevance of Control when Asserting Proper Rights after the 
Donor Has Died
The capacity to freeze sperm and eggs is of use to those who believe that 
their fertility may be compromised in the future. For instance, those about 
to undergo radiation treatment or surgery for cancer, or who are engaged in 
hazardous occupations can avail of the facility to store gametes for future use. 
If the donors die, the question then arises as to what is to be done with the 
gametes. In particular, the case-law concerns the fate of frozen sperm when 
the donor has died. While there is a wide consensus that personal choice in 
procreation should generally be respected, posthumous reproduction raises 
novel issues. The interests of the family, for example, in not having another 
child or sibling, the potential cost, and the interests of the child herself in not 
being born without a genetic parent are all possible counterweights to repro-
ductive autonomy being respected after death.90
Nonetheless, in disputes over the semen of a deceased’s sperm the determin-
ing issue is who is entitled to control over the samples. Normally, the donors’ 
wishes will be indicated in the standard form completed at the time of pro-
viding the samples. Disputes can potentially arise if no directions have been 
given by the donor as to what might happen to his sample post mortem, or if 
the directions have not been given in writing or in accordance with statutory 
requirements. There may also be a dispute between family members and part-
ners/wives as to who has control over the sample.91 Posthumous control over 
frozen embryos raises similar issues. The complicating factor with embryos, 
of course, is that two persons have provided gametes. If an embryo is used for 
reproduction, both parties reproduce of necessity. Disputes may arise where 
the survivor has different preferences as to whether they would like to repro-
duce to those of the deceased.92
The Californian authority of Hecht v. Superior Courts of Los Angeles County, 
is the earliest notable reported case relation to such matters.93 Hecht was cited 
with approval in Yearworth, but the court was asked to go a step further in 
determining if the semen could pass by succession. The frozen sperm was 
deposited with the clear, express, written intention that it be made use of by 
90 Robertson, supra note 50.
91 Ibid., 1035.
92 Ibid., 1045.
93 (1993) 20 Cal. Rptr 2d 275. Note, however, the earlier French case of Paraplaix v. CECO, 
discussed at J.A. Robertson, supra note 50, 1035. See also D.A. Rameden, ‘Frozen Semen as 
Property in Hecht v. Superior Court: One Step Forward: Two Steps Backward’, 62 Umkc Law 
Review (1993) 377.
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Hecht for the purposes of reproduction after the death of the donor. This inten-
tion was expressed in the sperm bank directive, his will, as well as his suicide 
note. The California Court of Appeal held that the donor had a limited prop-
erty right in the sperm and it thus fell into the estate and devolved via the 
residue clause in the will.94
It is important to note that the decedent’s intention to devise the semen by 
will did not directly lead to the finding that the sperm was property. Rather, it 
was the fact that this intention was clear evidence of a desire to exert continu-
ing control over the sperm after it had left his body, i.e., while he was still alive. 
The intention of the donor to exert control over samples after they have left the 
body would appear to be relevant for two possible reasons. First, if one accepts 
that there is no property in unseparated body parts, the semen becomes 
res nullius on its separation from the body, and the first to exert ownership over 
it becomes its owner.95 Alternatively, if my sperm is my property I must aban-
don or transfer/donate my rights to it before another can acquire a superior 
title.96 For instance, in Hecht the Moore case was distinguished on the basis 
that Moore had no interest in what was done with the tissue samples. In cir-
cumstances where Moore had been misled, the validity of this distinction was 
doubted, correctly in this author’s view, by the Yearworth court.97 Furthermore, 
Hecht would appear to be authority, not just for the existence of property in 
the sperm on the death of the deponent, but also during his lifetime. As Hecht 
concerned the legitimacy of a disposition in a will, the relevant question was 
whether the sperm was owned by the deceased immediately prior to his death 
so that it would form part of the estate.98
There are three recent Australian authorities which touch on similar issues. 
In Bazley v. Wesley Monash IVF Pty Ltd,99 the sperm sample had been frozen 
and stored before the death of the donor, but he had not provided any written 
consent governing the use of the sperm after his death, as was required by 
the relevant clinical guidelines. Applying Yearworth, it was held that there 
had been a gratuitous bailment of the sperm prior to the death. The sample 
was, ‘property’ for the purposes of the relevant succession statute vested in 
94 The right has been characterised as akin to the quasi property right that next-of-kin have 
over dead bodies, limited for the purposes of the probate jurisdiction, see Boulier, supra 
note 1, 700. 
95 Reid, supra note 22, 12-13.
96 Ibid., 13-18.
97 Yearworth, supra note 10, 40.
98 Quigley, supra note 72, 463.
99 [2010] Q.S.C. 118.
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the donor during his life, and his personal representatives after his death. The 
result is similar to Hecht, and a logical extension of the reasoning in Yearworth.
In both the Estate of the Late Mark Edwards100 and Re H, AE101 cases, there 
was a further complicating factor to the dispute in that both decedents had 
died before the sperm sample had been extracted, and neither had signed 
the necessary consent forms to such a procedure during their lifetime. In the 
Edwards case, Mr. Edwards was planning to donate sperm with a view to his 
wife undergoing IVF with the sample. He died tragically in a workplace acci-
dent before the necessary consent forms could be signed, and pursuant to an 
order made by the duty judge late one evening, sperm was extracted from the 
body and stored pending the outcome of the case. Hulme J was content to 
decide the question of property on the authority of Doodeward v. Spence,102 
and not as flowing from control rights as had been done in Yearworth and 
Bazley.103
As the removal of the tissue did involve such an application of work and 
skill, the sperm was thus found capable of constituting property. Ms. Edwards 
was held to be the only person entitled to property in the sperm, as the sam-
ples were removed on her behalf, and for her purposes, and ‘no-one else in the 
world had any interest in them’.104 Nevertheless, it appears that full-blooded 
ownership was not contemplated, as it was stated that ‘the common law right 
to possession of preserved samples should continue to be upheld, but full 
property rights should not be granted’.105 Regrettably, the court did not clarify 
the extent of the rights on the ownership spectrum that were in fact granted. 
Re H, AE concerned a similar factual matrix, and was decided on similar 
grounds.106 In both of these cases, it seems a finding of property in the samples 
was necessary so as to provide a remedy to the women.107 This was precisely 
what had happened in Yearworth, and lends support to the view that courts 
are favouring pragmatic ‘case-by-case’ application of the property paradigm to 
such materials.
One might speculate that the divergence of the Australian courts from 
Yearworth in both Edwards and Re H, AE in applying the Doodeward excep-
tion is at least partially based on a certain legal patriotism. It was also done of 
100 [2011] N.S.W.S.C. 478.
101 Re H, AE (No 2) [2012] S.A.S.C. 177; Re H, AE (No 3) [2013] S.A.S.C. 116.
102 (1908) 6 C.L.R. 406.
103 Supra note 99, para. 84.
104 Ibid., para. 91.
105 Ibid., para. 75.
106 Citing S v. Minister for Health (WA) [2008] W.A.S.C. 262 (5 November 2008) in support of 
the claim, supra n 101.
107 Quigley, supra note 4, 685.
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necessity, as the deceased in both cases was not regarded as having property 
in the samples prior to death. One can infer from this that the control that a 
person has over their complete body prior to their death is considered differ-
ently to the control exercised by the living donors over their frozen samples in 
Hecht, Yearworth, and Bazley. The latter was deemed sufficient to justify prop-
erty rights in the samples vesting in the men during their lives that were trans-
missible via their estate, the former provided no such justification for property. 
Thus, one might infer from the outcome of these cases that the court does 
not consider un-separated body parts as capable of being ‘owned’ and this 
certainly accords with the rump of the ‘no-property’ rule surviving and apply-
ing to the complete living body.
There is much scholarship on the idea that property must be separate and 
distinct from the person who owns it.108 While we might refer to ‘My Body’, 
these assertions are, for the most part, rhetorical and are not intended to imply 
full-blooded ownership over my complete living body, and would seem to more 
clearly assert use and control rights, what Harris describes as ‘mere property’ at 
best.109 Although the philosophical foundations of the separation thesis have 
been questioned,110 Edwards and H do seem to lend tacit support to this view. 
It is of note, however, that the use and control rights sought by the claimants 
in these cases, possession of the sample with a view to using them in repro-
duction, seem to differ little from those that the donor had prior to his death. 
On their surface, these cases are concerned with recovering possession, use or 
control of property (Edwards), or seeking damages consequent on its destruc-
tion (Yearworth). In substance, however, framing these disputes as property 
disputes provides a remedial avenue to those who wish to protect their choice 
to become a genetic parent with a person of their choosing, either by provid-
ing them with sufficient rights on the ownership spectrum (use and control) to 
enable the genetic potential of the samples to be realised, or to compensate if 
the samples are destroyed and that potential is lost.
These cases also recognise an additional incident on the ownership 
spectrum — transmissibility. Transmissibility, in Honoré’s view, means that 
the owner may transmit his interest to the holder’s successors ad infinitum, 
although he accepts that transmissibility can exist and ‘yet stop short at the 
first, second or third generation of transmitees’.111 That such limited rights 
exist in body parts would seem clear from the fact that a person may make 
108 Penner, supra note 2, 105-127; Harris, supra note 17, 55-84; Munzer, supra note 2, 37-58; 
Quigley, supra note 2, 659-683. 
109 Harris, supra note 17, 62-65.
110 Quigley, supra note 2.
111 Honoré, supra note 15, 120-121.
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gratuitous donations of their organs after death. The limits, if any, of such a 
right are not always clear from the case-law. This is an issue of considerable 
importance. In a case involving an unqualified finding that the sperm was part 
of the estate of the deceased, the sample would descend to the heirs who pre-
sumably would have an unfettered right to use it without regard to the pro-
creative intentions of the deceased. This mischief was foreseen by the French 
tribunal in Parpalaix,112 but has come to pass in other cases. For instance, in 
Hecht, the decedent has made it very clear that the frozen semen was to be 
used for reproduction after his death by a specific person. Yet the probate 
court ordered the sperm to be deposited as residual assets of the estate in a 
20:40:40 scheme of arrangement between the girlfriend and two children. Only 
on appeal did the court revise its view of property as only the property of his 
girlfriend for the purposes of reproduction.113
The clear written directions as to the decedent’s posthumous reproductive 
intentions that were available to the court in Hecht were not available to the 
judges in the Australian cases. Yet, in each of these cases there were factual 
circumstances from which one could infer a similar intention. In Bazley, sperm 
had been deposited prior to death, while in Edwards and Re H, AE there was evi-
dence that decedent had similar intentions. In Re H, AE, the use of the sperm 
was limited to treatment procedures involving the decedent’s former partner, 
a similar qualification to that contained in Hecht.114 One might speculate that 
had the question been put to the court in Edwards, it would have limited the 
right to use the sperm to the surviving partners of the men. That is not the case, 
however, and the claimant in Edwards was granted a right of possession seem-
ingly without qualification.115
As Hulme J noted ‘all that is sought is a declaration that she is entitled to 
possession of the sperm. The Court is being asked, in effect, to put aside any 
consideration of what she might do with it as a result of such possession’.116 As 
Hubin has noted, it is tempting to consider that property in different things 
equates with roughly the same set of rights in those things.117 The question 
as to whether the surviving partners in these cases could sell the samples, or 
make use of them with a different person is left unanswered. It would seem 
doubtful that such a result, equating as it does with granting full-blooded 
112 As noted by Lord Stewart in Holdich, supra note 69, para. 44-45.
113 Supra note 94.
114 Per Gray J. In: Re H, AE (no 3) [2013] S.A.S.C. 196.
115 Para. 78, supra note 101.
116 Ibid., para. 24.
117 Hubin, supra note 3, 107.
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ownership in the samples to the women, would have been intended or desir-
able in any of these cases. Yet, such is the danger of invoking property as a 
concept with all of its imprecision as a method of demarcating which rights are 
in issue. Gametes and embryos are, of course unique because of their potential 
for reproduction. Although capable of being preserved in a viable state when 
separated from the body, there is some uneasiness as to whether they are truly 
separate from the person given their potential to render a donor a genetic par-
ent with all the attendant psychological, and possibly financial consequences 
of such an occurrence.118
4 Conclusion
The issues of control and property rights in separated human biomaterials are 
intertwined and often conflated. This are not synonymous issues, however, and 
the existence of control rights does not inevitably lead to a conclusion that one 
has property in these materials. While each of Honoré’s standard incidents are 
commonly referred to as property rights, individually they are not sufficient for 
property to exist. Just because an object is subject to some of the incidents of 
ownership does not always lead to a conclusion that it is property. At the very 
least, more than one of Honoré’s standard incidents must be present for there 
to be property. Article 22 of the Convention on Biomedicine merely provides 
for management powers, and does not presuppose property as a result.
The attempt of the Court of Appeal in Yearworth to place its finding of prop-
erty in sperm on a ‘broader basis’ than the problematic exception espoused in 
Doodeward (i.e. control justifying property) has only been of limited success 
and there is an inconsistent relationship between control and property. First, 
property has not been in issue in factually similar cases (Evans). Secondly, the 
absence of Yearworth — type control rights has not prevented courts from 
finding that property exists, utilising some other justification. Thus, ‘property’ 
as a category is still applied in an inconsistent manner for differing and some-
times contradictory purposes. Control rights have been used to justify a find-
ing of property but not any additional control rights in some of the cases 
(Yearworth, Bazley), while conversely being utilised to justify continuing con-
trol in cases where a finding of property has been justified on other grounds 
(Hecht, Edwards, H, AE, York v. Jones). Such results are undoubtedly related to 
judicial reasoning focussed on ‘the right result’ in seeking to utilise property 
118 Holdich, supra note 69, para. 6-9 and 50; Wall, supra note 29.
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remedies where deemed appropriate, while not providing any detailed justifi-
catory grounding for such a finding.
There are additional difficulties. Invoking property as a category gives little 
indication of itself as to the rights we are talking about since an object may 
be property when many of the incidents associated with full-blooded owner-
ship are either missing or circumscribed. The absence of a definite criteria 
for establishing what property is, as well as the tendency to conflate property 
rights with full blooded ownership further confuses matters, and may lead to 
unintended consequences as is evident in Hecht and Edwards. Regrettably, in 
cases where control and property are in issue, courts have tended to put aside 
questions as to whether separated human biomaterials ought appropriately 
to be considered objects of property, preferring instead to invoke property 
in a haphazard manner to provide a remedy where none would otherwise be 
available, or as a means to justify continuing control of the material by one 
of the parties to the litigation. Indeed, seeking to categorise objects as prop-
erty or non-property can be unhelpful in moving the focus of discussions away 
from what the appropriate remedy should be, to one of taxonomy. Identifying 
appropriate remedies with precision should surely be the focus of these dis-
putes. The concept of property is not precise, and judges should be cognisant 
of this deficiency and the difficulties it can lead to when approaching disputes 
in this area.
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